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Abstract: Many critics accuse Giorgio Agamben of an ahistoricism inherent to his thought. 
Recently, such criticism was put forward by Alberto Toscano, who formulated it referring to 
Hans Blumenberg’s refusal of the secularisation thesis and his theory of epochal shifts. 
According to Toscano, due to the acceptance of the Schmittian notion of secularisation, 
based on a historical substantialism, Agamben is not only unfaithful to the Foucaultian 
methodology which he declaratively assumes, but he also tends to acknowledge the 
domination of theological notions as a source of the whole Western philosophical tradition 
and political institutions up until now. I am going to demonstrate that even somewhat 
superficial claims made by Agamben about secularisation find their compensation in his 
double effort. Firstly, even if he concedes the gravity of the theological legacy, at the same 
time he rebuts the primacy of religion as an indispensable grounding of ethics and politics. 
What is more, through his meticulous and condense studies on Christian theology he has 
already placed himself  in the position of the most incisive contemporary critic of the 
Catholic church and any theological-political hybrids established on the abuse of power.  
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A predicament of secularisation 
Il Regno e la gloria, published in 2007, marks a thematic shift in the whole Agambenian oeuvre, 
namely the  involvement in a detailed analysis of Christian theology viewed from the 
perspective of its inner logic – the divine oikonomia1. However, the text does not equate to      
a change of the political issues at stake in Agamben’s theory. Rather, in his recent 
publications Agamben tries to complement his prolonged investigations by demonstrating 
how contemporary models of government depend on a peculiar complexio oppositorum laying at 
the centre of Christology and trinitarian theology. That is the problem of how to reconcile 
God’s existence beyond time and space – his Being or eternal and unchangeable Essence – 
with his commitment to the economy (or the history) of salvation, which presuppose God’s 
actions, decisions, and, at last, his incarnation into the form of the human-divine hybrid, 
Jesus Christ. When expressed in political terms, these dilemmas turn into a chiasmus, or 
binary coexistence, between sovereign decisionistic politics (transcendence) and the 
horizontal management of global economy (immanence). In other words, Agamben intends 
to explain the contemporary political realm – seen as the indivisible magma of life as such, 
and politics, mediated through management as the only active pseudo-political practice – by 
referring it to the theological debates of late antiquity concerning the Holy Trinity and the 
Incarnation of God. It may be that since the death of Hans Blumenberg we have not seen in 
the history of Western thought any theoretical framework comparable in its expanse and 
depth, except that offered by Agamben. The ambitious task of the latter confronts 
methodological constrains that must be always taken into account when one aspires to 
encompass two millennia within one horizon.  
The Agambenian method of inquiry was criticized recently by Alberto Toscano, who 
employed Blumenberg’s argumentation against the secularization theorem to accuse 
Agamben’s approach of a double lapse that consists of “historical substantialism” and 
“reductivist idealism” (Toscano 2011, 126, 128). I feel tempted to scrutinize this intriguing 
polemics, because chances are that something important really happened when Agamben 
provided the appropriate key to the arcana of Christendom. What is ironic, and at the same 
time highly problematic for the purely secular flank, is that he did not need to break down the 
doors of the ecclesiastical archives, but opened them from within. For some critics this faux 
                                               
1  I would like to express my gratitude to the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna, where this text was 
written during my stay at the Józef  Tischner Junior Visiting Fellowship, sponsored by the Institute for Human 
Sciences, Vienna, the Pope John Paul II Foundation, the Open Society Institute (Zug), and the Kosciuszko 
Foundation, Inc., New York. It was the hospitality and the friendliness of  the people who make  the IWM that 
gave me the chance to work freely on the topic “Hannah Arendt’s Early Thought as a Response to the Political 
Theology”, to which this paper contributes as a methodological preparation. Additional thanks go to the two 
anonymous reviewers and to the editors of  Theoretical Practice, Joanna Bednarek and Mikołaj Ratajczak, for their 
percipient comments.  
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pas is unpardonable, because it contravened the well-guarded division between secularity and 
religion, which delineates one of the most relevant achievements of modern Western 
civilisation and its political culture. Thus, Giorgio Agamben became the enfant terrible of the 
global Left. 
A brief elucidation must be made to indicate the quarrel’s kernel. According to 
Toscano, Agamben’s recent writings are founded upon substantialist and idealist 
presuppositions, because the author passed off an important German debate around the 
meaning of the term “secularisation” which took place mainly in the 1960s and 1970s. It 
concerned the original character of Western modernity. As one of its participants, Hans 
Blumenberg was compelled to defend the unprecedentedness and the legitimate character of 
the modern age against interpretations proposed by Eric Voegelin, Karl Löwith, and Carl 
Schmitt, who regarded modernity and its political vocabulary as the by-product of some older 
theological matrix (Blumenberg 1983). The consequence of such thinking is a vision of 
history as a transmission of the same “contents” disguised in different “forms”. In effect, the 
so-called secular epoch could not emancipate itself from its religious-theological heritage. 
According to the propagators of the secularisation schema, modernity’s secular character is 
nothing more than flimsy varnish that overlies previous epochs (treated as real “substance” 
or “content”) which are supposed to surreptitiously mastermind the secular age. Toscano 
claims that the “economic theology” elaborated by Agamben suffers from the same 
methodological inadequacies that Blumenberg detected in the historiographical schemas of 
those thinkers who used the notion of secularisation in order to delegitimise the development 
of post-religious civilisation in Western Europe. What is more, Toscano dismisses Agamben’s 
conception of the “signatures” – projected to explain how some notions as well as vast 
paradigms of political thought survived from antiquity to the present day, accommodating 
slightly their meaning without the need for changing names – as reliant “on putative personal 
insight and analogical thinking” (Toscano 2011, 128)2. 
It is not disputable that Agamben sometimes takes the secularisation process for 
granted, especially when pointing to some religious antecedents and their “secularized” 
counterparts. For example, when he compares tourism to the pilgrimage movement 
(Agamben 2011a, 140) or when he has no reservations about calling the philosophy of history 
“an essentially Christian discipline” (Agamben 2012, 34)3. What must be genuinely harmful 
                                               
2  Toscano refers to that methodological statement: “[i]f  we are not able to perceive signatures and follow 
the displacements and movements they operate in the tradition of  ideas, the mere history of  concepts can, at 
times, end up being entirely insufficient” (Agamben 2011a, 4). In the original it sounds even more powerfully: 
“Se non si possiede la capacità di percepire le segnature e di seguire le dislocazioni e gli spostamenti che esse 
operano nella tradizione delle idee, la semplice storia dei concetti può, a volte, risultare del tutto insufficiente” 
(Agamben 2007a, 16). 
3  The most intriguing  is the statement that what we call today the “biological body” is a secularized 
notion of  bare life (Agamben 2014, 267–268) – in Il uso dei corpi the author literally repeats some fragments 
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for a secular understanding of the world is the fact that for Agamben even the flagship 
representatives of non-religious thought – like Kantian ethics (Agamben 2013a, 122) and the 
Marxian conceptualisation of praxis (Agamben 2011a, 91) – might be seen as secularized 
forms that mimetically reflect some theological ideas. Thus, although the first set of examples 
does not go beyond conventional bon mots, the second one does not allow similar 
marginalisation, but rather resembles Schmitt’s “systematic structure” (Schmitt 1985, 36). 
Therefore, Toscano’s Blumenbergian scepticism towards Agamben’s “theological genealogy” 
(Toscano 2011, 129)4 was formulated not without reason. As overtly a- or anti-metaphysical 
philosophies, Kantianism and Marxism may be theologically structured.  This is explicitly 
demonstrated in Opus Dei and The Kingdom and the Glory, and it implies a kind of transhistorical 
invariance. However, it would be  an overstatement to decree substantialism on those 
grounds. Agambenian usage of structural analogies is “stronger” (in terms of historical 
continuity) than Blumenberg’s functionalism (and Foucault’s archaeology), although 
“weaker” than Schmitt’s, Löwith’s or Voegelin’s substantialism. 
It also makes sense to point out the idealistic tone, sometimes evident in the writings 
of Agamben, who seems to believe in an almost autonomous life of the dispositifs he describes. 
In that perspective humans appear to be puppets without agency, whose efforts are reduced 
to the actualisation of some hidden patterns embedded in the structure of language:  
It is all the more surprising that, in the 1977–1978 course [given by Michel Foucault – 
RZ], the notion of providence is never referred to. And yet the theories of Kepler, 
Galileo, Ray, and the Port-Royal circle that Foucault refers to do nothing other than 
to radicalize, as we shall see, the distinction between general and special providence 
into which the theologians had transposed, in their own way, the opposition between 
the Kingdom and the Government. The passage from ecclesiastical pastorate to 
political government, which Foucault tries to explain – in all truth, in not terribly 
convincing a way – by means of the emergence of a whole series of counterpractices 
that resist the pastorate, is far more comprehensible if it is seen as a secularization of 
the detailed phenomenology of first and second, proximate and distant, occasional 
                                                                                                                                                   
already written in 1993 in the text entitled Forma-di-vita (Agamben 2000, 7–8). It may imply that bare life, 
surrounded by Agamben with so much piety, is a life not totally deprived of  transcendent connotation. 
Obviously, this uncanny ambiguity could be nothing more than a kind of  gloriole accompanying exceptional 
figures, like victims condemned to be killed. Seen through that prism, bare life is what remains after contact 
with transcendence, which brings about the kiss of  death. Just for that reason, Agamben is looking for             
a “form-of-life” whose condition of  being “unsavable” protects her once and for all from any romance with 
the divine. But is this a sufficient answer to the inner indecisiveness and excessiveness of  life itself? 
4  This undoubtedly malicious label serves Toscano for imputing that Agambenian “theological” writings 
keep their validity only within the Christian world view. The following cutting remark extends this hermeneutic 
stance: “it is the specifically Christian fate of  oikonomia, as the anarchic immanence of  a divine government 
tenuously articulated, via providence, with a transcendent God who ‘reigns but does not govern’, which justifies 
the theological character of  this genealogical investigation” (Toscano 2011, 127; original emphasis). 
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and efficient causes, general and particular wills, mediated and immediate concourses, 
ordinatio and executio, by means of which the theoreticians of providence had tried to 
make the divine government of the world intelligible (Agamben 2011a, 112).  
No wonder then that Toscano noticed a betrayal of the Foucaultian method. It is indeed 
analogous to Agamben’s declaration that he intends to think starting from the frontiers 
reached but never crossed by Hannah Arendt. The same interpretative measure of absorption 
and abandonment was applied to Blumenberg’s work. Agamben encounters Blumenberg as    
a reader of Jacob Taubes and this fact determines his stance. Like Taubes, Agamben  works 
closely to Schmitt (even if he proceeds against him) and affirms the secularisation thesis. 
However, by doing this he aims just at overcoming the thesis and refuting any possible 
pretension formulated on its basis against  “theological politics”5. Furthermore, Agamben’s 
ambition is to abolish political theology, or at least to provide evidence that such a hybrid 
could not stem from Christianity. For that reason, he  is not compelled to choose between 
Blumenberg and Schmitt, because he thinks he has found a vaster paradigm embracing them 
both. And not only them. Lastly, Jan Assmann, inspired by the cue made by Taubes in 
person, elaborated a thesis (which is partly a repetition of Ernst Kantorowicz’s claim) which 
turns Schmitt’s argumentation upside down: according to Assmann, Schmitt’s famous dictum 
could be legitimately inverted and then one may, analogically, consider the main theological 
concepts as political ones at the bottom. Agamben comments:  
More interesting than taking sides with one thesis or the other is, however, to try to 
understand the functional relationship that links the two principles. Glory is precisely 
the place at which this bilateral (or bi-univocal) character of the relation between 
theology and politics clearly emerges into the light (Agamben 2011a, 193).  
What does this  mean? First of all, that Agamben does not take Schmitt’s side unreservedly. 
Further, that he, who himself put a lot of effort into being associated with the “I would 
prefer not to” position, chose a very risky path and decided  to step onto theological ground to 
probe the endurance of the well-known conservative incantations about the fall of the West 
caused by the death of God and the diminishing role of religious authority. As we shall see, 
Agamben wants to show the one-sidedness of those  claims by divesting them of their 
undeserved glory, that is – of their misleading force of persuasion. He intends to bypass 
current ideological conflicts between secular and religious forces without neutralising them. 
Using words that demand attention, in a speech delivered at  the Notre Dame Cathedral in 
Paris on  March 8th, 2009, Agamben seemed to reach for the crest: “I say the following with 
                                               
5  I borrow this term from György Geréby (Geréby 2008). 
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words carefully weighed: nowhere on earth today is a legitimate power to be found; even the 
powerful are convinced of their own illegitimacy” (Agamben 2012, 40). The Catholic church 
included, no doubt. No one can escape from guilt. Only the passionate toughness of 
impartiality can save us: parrhesia against irony and cynicism. 
That is why I am not persuaded by Toscano’s argument that “Agamben haughtily 
dismisses the theoretical significance of the secularisation debate” (Toscano 2011, 127). On 
the contrary, in my opinion, Agamben belongs to the group of a few leading contemporary 
thinkers who regard themselves as responsible for the new phase of this debate6. My 
intention is not to judge whether he is right or wrong;  it would be a chutzpah to deal in one 
short commentary text with the enormously rich material that Agamben studied. I find it 
more fruitful to take a step backwards and draw up the possibilities and ambiguities provoked 
by the theological-economic enterprise. This does not mean that Blumenberg’s reservations 
are annulled. Instead, it will be more appropriate to speak about their provisional 
postponement7. 
The sacrifice of theology vs. theological sacrifice 
No one could pretend to conduct  value-free research when secularisation is concerned. So 
when Toscano states, in the form of an objection, that “for Agamben, secularisation is          
a strategic gambit, not a historiographic thesis” (Toscano 2011, 127), that is the point. 
Agamben tends to concede that, all in all, any debate on secularisation, at least since Max 
Weber (and I would prefer to say that at least since Hegel) is inseparable from politics 
(Agamben 2009a, 76–77). (Suffice it to mention the seemingly stable – if seen from the angle 
of both jurisprudence and official theology – status of ecclesiastical properties in  times when 
neoliberal expropriations take place on a large scale). The very fact that Toscano engaged the 
Blumenbergian project (which, to tell the truth, is not at all leftist) and his methodology 
against Agamben, is sufficient proof in favour of Agamben’s persuasion that the concept of 
secularisation “has performed a strategic function in modern culture” (Agamben 2011a, 3). It 
usually marks a political enemy8. That’s why Carl Schmitt could not agree with Blumenberg 
                                               
6  What might be justly admitted is that Agamben disavows the significance of  “secularisation” in favour 
of  what he considers to be a broader frame, namely the theodicy of  history, which is also called oikonomia or 
complexio oppositorum. Thus, he suspends, in a sense, an inclination to Blumenberg or Schmitt, taking a step 
further.   
7  Which is a manoeuvre not so distant from what Hans Blumenberg himself  accepted as a mode of  
moral conduct proper to the modern age, namely: la morale provisoire (Blumenberg 2010, 2).  
8  Toscano’s reaction provoked by some Agambenian critical remarks towards Marxism is rather a sidestep 
than an attempt to challenge them. In contrast, Agamben seems to feel obliged, as an intellectual who 
acknowledges also his Marxian roots, to criticize totalitarian and bureaucratic abuses of  power committed by 
the political regimes that called themselves “communist”. What is also important for Marxist studies, his 
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who tended to present his historiographical study on the threshold of modernity as politically 
neutral. 
Although the references to Blumenberg in Agamben are sporadic, in Il regno e la gloria 
we can find some comments, which clearly show that the latter is not unconcerned about the 
stance of the former. In an opening passage Agamben expounds that for Schmitt,  
theology continues to be present and active in an eminent way. This does not 
necessarily imply an identity of substance between theology and modernity, or             
a perfect identity of meaning between theological and political concepts; rather, it 
concerns a particular strategic relation that marks political concepts and refers them 
back to their theological origin (Agamben 2011a, 4). 
There is no doubt that the phrase “identity of substance” evokes Die Legitimität der Neuzeit9. 
Like Blumenberg, Agamben is preoccupied with a refutation of Schmitt’s thesis. But, unlike 
Blumenberg, he cannot do so by defending modernity and its secular ethos. 
Agamben considers modern politics to be theological, in other words, still reliant on 
the schemas elaborated as explanations of the divine government over the world. He reveals 
its “theological origin” without the  intention to acknowledge (like Schmitt) that secular 
politics is impossible, ergo – that all political concepts remain delegitimised (Toscano 2011, 
128) unless they return submissively to the dictatus papae. Conversely, to christen modern 
politics “theological” is to call for its stronger and more definitive profanation. In other 
words, politics that needs the extra-terrestrial to legitimize itself in fact delegitimises itself as 
theologically structured. As far back as 1995, when Agamben initiated an investigation of the 
ambiguous sacredness of the scapegoat10, he unequivocally declared that “the proximity 
between the sphere of sovereignty and the sphere of the sacred […] is not simply the 
secularized residue of the originary religious character of every political power, nor merely    
the attempt to grant the latter a theological foundation” (Agamben 1998, 84–85). 
In order to stem the Uroboros-like cycles of violence and to put an end to the 
economy of sacrifice, the very principle of division must be abolished. Theology, due to its 
obsession with theodicy, is one of the nodal points that keep this cruel machinery in 
motion11, but it is not its ultimate ground. Additionally, Agamben posits that “the thesis 
                                                                                                                                                   
theological genealogy almost directly implies that what was originally used in the discussions on the Holy 
Trinity and predestination later become a basis for the reelaboration of  dialectics in German philosophy. 
9   See Blumenberg 1985, 16, 29, as well as the entire chapters 8. and 9., where Hans Blumenberg 
challenged Carl Schmitt’s political theology. 
10  The term homo sacer appeared for the first time in Agamben’s writings in 1982 (Agamben 1991, 105; 
Agamben 1999, 136). 
11  One of  the thinkers to whom Agamben is mostly indebted, René Girard, stressed that theology had 
always served – in contrast to the unjustified pride expressed in the dictum philosophia ancilla theologiae – as the 
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according to which the economy could be a secularized theological paradigm acts 
retroactively on theology” (Agamben 2011a, 3). The concession given to Schmitt by 
emphasizing how important theology has been turns against the conservatism implicit in his 
theories12, as well as against the exceptional character of theology. Agamben is convinced that 
ignorance with regard to the theological tradition not only indicates a “decline of 
philosophical culture” (Agamben 2011a, 5), but also strengthens this taboo-like status           
of theology. In contrast, what could finally make it inoperative is nothing other than studying 
it13. Studying uncovers the consequent layers of “tradition”, showing that all of them were 
failed attempts to keep the unnamed at distance14. For Agamben, archaeological inquiry 
focuses simultaneously on this empty centre and its historical articulations that overshadowed 
the emptiness of language building – upon, and thanks to, its arbitrariness – an illusion of the 
primary “origin”. 
The Agambenian approach hesitates between the temptations of metaphorical and 
literal meaning. Thus, his “theological” description of biopolitics is affected by ambivalence.  
I will show two appropriate examples, starting from the following statement: “It is not 
necessary to share Schmitt’s thesis on secularization in order to affirm that political problems 
                                                                                                                                                   
universal mechanism of  justification: “the sacrificial process requires a certain degree of  misunderstanding. The 
celebrants do not and must not comprehend the true role of  the sacrificial act. The theological basis of          
the sacrifice has a crucial role in fostering this misunderstanding. It is the god who supposedly demands the 
victims […]. Interpreters who think they question the primacy of  the divine sufficiently by declaring the whole 
affair ‘imaginary’ may well remain the prisoners of  the theology they have not really analyzed” (Girard 1977, 7). 
12  The same can be said about Agambenian “metabolisation” of  Girard’s legacy. For further elaboration 
of  this topic, see Fox 2007, Depoortere 2011, Dickinson 2011b, Sudlow 2012. 
13  This may be seen as a betrayal of  his own idea of  profanation based on “negligence” (Agamben 2007b, 
75), which was intended to secure from the aporia of  transgression as an implicit confirmation of  the status quo. 
Nonetheless, I am partial to another spin: that at first Agamben was collecting the elements of  the paradigm he 
intended to destroy and in the end attained the level of  such a condensation, that it allowed him to “abandon” 
this paradigm, when all was  said and done. I would venture to say that by doing this he became the homo sacer 
of  theory, because it was rather his duty, not pleasure, to be rapt in political consideration. This may throw light 
on the harsh criticism he received and also on his spiritual position on the map of  contemporary thought. 
Suffice it to mention here only one, but incisive example. At the end of  his article, one author used Jesus’ 
words, turning them towards Giorgio Agamben as a judgement passed on his messianism: “let the dead bury 
the dead” (Sharpe 2009, 40.16). 
14 Hans Blumenberg initiated his Work on Myth from a magnificent anthropological narrative according to which 
the human being’s initial and formative challenge was “the absolutism of  reality” – the cavernous vastness of  space 
that was losing its tremendous hostility in the course of  naming it. Naming means dividing, i.e. weakening the 
pressure of  unpredictability and fear that could paralyse human life, endangered, because deprived of  any natural 
niche. For Blumenberg “myth” and “dogma” are two different methods of  coping with the aboriginal danger. “The 
stories that it is our purpose to discuss here – he writes – simply weren’t told in order to answer questions, but rather 
in order to dispel uneasiness and discontent, which have to be present in the beginning for questions to be able to 
form themselves. To prevent fear and uncertainty already means not to allow the questions about what awakens them 
and excites them to arise or to reach concrete form. In connection with this, the consciousness that one cannot, after 
all, answer such questions may enter in as an imponderable factor, as long as they cannot be averted, in an 
institutionalized milieu, or disparaged as hubris, or as in the milieu of  modern science assigned to progress that has 
not yet occurred” (Blumenberg 1985, 184). So Blumenberg shares with Agamben initial intuitions about 
foundational negativity, but the former affirms the linguistic event that gave birth to humankind, while the latter 
expresses his great wariness of  it. 
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become more intelligible and clear if they are related to theological paradigms” (Agamben 
2011a, 229). In my view, here we still have the  possibility of a metaphorical (that is to say 
Blumenbergian) reading of economic theology. In the case of the second example, things go 
differently, particularly if one takes into consideration that it is a quote from the already 
evoked speech that Giorgio Agamben gave at the Notre Dame Cathedral, so the place and 
circumstances enhance the resonance of this unique voice: “The crises – the states of 
permanent exception and emergency – that the governments of the world continually 
proclaim are in reality a secularized parody of the Church’s incessant deferral of the Last 
Judgement” (Agamben 2012, 40). Had it been a casual association, Agamben’s statement 
would not have judged the contemporary legal crisis as blasphemy. But what stands behind 
this claim can by no means be limited to a figure of speech, because according to Agamben, 
Christian theology of the first centuries struggled with the same ontological schemas that 
have been capturing the Western perception of life. Those schemas constitute a solid 
structure. What is more, by tracing theological (and ontological) thought back to its roots, 
Agamben not only intends to uncloak the structural analogies and the empty centre, but to 
indicate at something hidden beneath – the aliveness upon which the discourse about “life” 
was formed15. To treat the above-mentioned seriously, literally, one must acknowledge what 
is the subject of the politics of deferral. It is not a meaning or an abstract structure, but 
suffering life.  
This leads directly to a question concerning the human condition and more 
specifically, a question about  where lie the limes which make suffering caused by natural 
fatality almost indistinguishable from what befalls history. Even if Agamben would not agree 
with that, his divorcing from anthropocentrism does not exclude therefore some kind of 
anthropology, otherwise one could not explain his persistent obsession with anthropogenesis 
(Agamben 2004). Humanity means coming to terms with animality, or, to put it more 
precisely, an attitude of speaking beings toward the fact of their aliveness. Theology is only 
one of many speculative formations that responded to this challenge, but its response, 
especially in a moralistic explanation of the original sin, obscured the whole question, 
                                               
15  This enigmatic aliveness, given as an experience and forced to become a notion, was what Hannah 
Arendt in her doctoral thesis from 1929 destined to pertain to “the pretheological sphere”, which in my 
opinion accentuated anthropology as a point of  resistance to theology and every totalizing discourse; see 
Zawisza 2012. Aliveness was then elaborated quite differently through the biopolitical paradigm, among others 
by Agamben, but with an unreserved acceptance of  the Heideggerian antihumanist vista, which undermines 
the consistency of  any positive proposal. Biopolitics fails in its conceptualisation of  the endless richness of  life 
by excluding one form of  its expressions, namely the peculiar unnatural character of  the human condition. 
Thus, I am inclined to regard Agata Bielik-Robson’s messianic vitalism, which is deeply concerned with 
antinaturalistic humanism (Bielik-Robson 2012), as an unavoidable voice in the contemporary debate about 
“life”, dominated mostly by  thinkers associated with the biopolitical paradigm. Bielik-Robson’s theory of  life 
introduces a polemical alternative, which is more in tune with the intuitions embedded in Arendtian natalism. 
On her polemics with Agamben, see Bielik-Robson 2010, Bielik-Robson 2011a.  
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ascribing imperfection to humankind and thus ending any discussion16. For that reason, 
Agamben seeks a detheologized view of life – trying to think simultaneously of the initial 
threshold when homo sapiens appeared  – rather than theological ground.  
What Toscano’s critique misses is nothing other than anthropology, which allows 
Agamben to gaze at the far-reaching historical horizon, even at the expense of loosening ties 
with Foucaultian skepsis, but without the intention of its total abandonment. It seems that 
Agamben mistrusted consequent relativism and he is trying now to cope with the question of 
why some modes of thought, like the sacrifices, survived through the ages intact. Toscano 
underestimates the gravity of this question, saying, “Nor does Agamben consider the 
possibility that the persistence of certain thought forms might be less relevant than their 
redeployment to radically different ends within incommensurable discursive formations” 
(Toscano 2011, 127)17. For Agamben it would still be a sidestep to equate “systematic 
structures” with simple transposition or the mysterious journey of philosophically conceived 
essences. Agamben speaks also about necessary “omissions” and exclusions that 
accompanied operations of transfer between theology and politics (Agamben 2011a, 272). 
Those omissions are unpredictable and in that sense contingent, nonetheless their  incessant 
returns are necessary18 – due to the impossibility of the goal they are supposed to achieve, 
                                               
16 Although, as I argued, both myth and dogma try to face the problem of  questions without answers and for 
that reason both of  them pretend to have sufficient answers, „[…] the myth satisfies the criterion of  totality by 
leaving nothing unsaid. The myth allows one to see that there is nothing more there to say and there will never be 
more to say something that no theory can dare to assert” (Blumenberg 1985, 177). Instead of  an overabundance of  
stories produced by myth to accommodate various inquietudes,  dogma chooses one version and attempts to make it 
definitive: “[…] across the history of  mankind’s consciousness, questions have been posed and then answers have 
been attempted whose inadequacy exposed them to displacement by other answers to the same questions. Dogma 
appears as a defense against this process of  displacement, as laying something down in a written form made 
definitive by an extraordinary sanction. It can be accomplished only by institutionalization, and that makes it clear 
how inimical to institutions myth is” (Blumenberg 1985, 184). 
17 Additionally, Toscano writes that “it is not so much the continuity of  the theological but the persistence of  
certain social relations and their imaginaries, which explains the insistence of  certain ideas of  government 
throughout such a longue dureée” (Toscano 2011, 127). Although Agamben does not employ this second option often, 
the “bi-univocal” structure of  the governmental machine envisages as part of  its inner, fundamental reciprocity        
a mutual bolstering of  materially embedded patterns (e.g. the Persian court’s rules – an example used by Agamben 
and praised by Toscano) and their ideal, conceptually codified images. What is more, Agamben’s Girardianism 
predisposes him to detect in “the persistence of  certain social relations and their imaginaries” an indispensable trace 
of  theological justification, which every religion (according to him, the capitalist one too) uses to obscure cruelty 
behind the fumes of  glory. Neither politics, nor theology dominates – rivalry between them resembles twin 
animosities: what dominates is symmetry, because to speak about God and Kingdom the first Christian theologians 
adopted political concepts which later were maintained by references to theology. 
18  The problem of  how to approach Agambenian methods in relation to the history of  ideas and the history of  
concepts reaches beyond the scope of  this article. Nonetheless, Elías José Palti in his text about German debates 
concerning the relations between these two methodologies posed the questions which must be addressed also 
towards Agamben: “On the one hand, it is necessary to postulate the existence of  an ineradicable remainder of  
facticity that prevents the logical closure of  conceptual systems and opens them to temporality. Only this postulate 
may explain the openness of  conceptual formations: why change is intrinsic to conceptual history. But, on the other 
hand, this postulate raises a number of  new issues: how to approach this realm that resists symbolization according 
to the categories available in a given language, and that dislocates it. If  this realm is not already invested with 
meaning, what is its ontological nature, and what are the ways by which it eventually enters the symbolic ambit and 
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namely to bridge the gap between word and flesh, between the speaking being and its 
aliveness.   
Since Toscano did not take into account the deepest ground of Agambenian 
thought, he could graciously write  that,  
though Agamben does not straightforwardly embody the apologetic Christian 
purposes that Hans Blumenberg identifies in the discourse on secularisation – the idea 
that the conceptual patrimony of the Church was expropriated and misused – he does 
manifest one of the key aspects of that discourse, the idea of a substantial continuity 
(Toscano 2011, 128).  
If we would need to indicate a candidate for “substance” in Agamben’s thought, it could only 
be “life as such” (or maybe: pure aliveness), however – as I mentioned earlier – even this 
concept was affected by historical mutations (inter alia related to secularisation) and always 
already captured by some structure of its articulation. On the other hand, the mysterious 
continuity of those structures might be explained thanks to the following hypothesis: 
although we are removed from late antiquity by many epochal changes, dogma has 
nonetheless remained preserved by ecclesiastical bodies – simply by repetition19. In turn, this 
repetition was effective  enough so as to transmit the general conceptual framework that had 
been forming Western thought throughout history even after churches and synagogues      
had lost their power over political institutions and communities. Even if this would be an 
accurate historical reconstruction, Agamben will remain mostly preoccupied by the very 
condition that makes life subjected, namely “[…] this split in the experience of language that 
law and religion are born, both of which seek to tie speech to things and to bind, by means of 
curses and anathemas, speaking subjects to the veritative power of their speech, to their 
“oath” and to their declaration of faith (Agamben 2011b, 58).” 
We see how the fact that Agamben dared to take a step out of the edifice of 
historicism provokes anathemas that were intended to call into question his fame as a critical 
theorist. Nevertheless, there is no need to worry about his reputation in that regard. One may 
have reservations towards the methodology applied by Agamben; however, he can by no 
                                                                                                                                                   
forces it to become reconfigured?” (Palti 2010, 198). What is more, another challenge for conceptual history – next 
to Agambenian polemics with constructivist approaches – could be a history redescribed according to the lines of  
personal idiosyncrasies of  the author and scientific writing practiced as a form of  life, which is still characteristic 
feature of  Central and Eastern European intelligentsia, see Bielik-Robson 2011b, Majewski 2011, Ulicka 2007, Ulicka 
2013.  
19 Agamben, however, seems to be more concentrated on continuity than on conceptual swerves. This is 
his vice, especially in comparison with Blumenberg whose arabesque style made his writings incomparably 
more profound. His Work on Myth is ornamented with many peculiar, often very funny examples and anecdotes 
that play on self-contradictions to expose fruitful incongruences or forgotten paths, neglected by “tradition” 
which, without these idiosyncrasies, would have become a lumber room full of  slogans and banalities. 
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means be enthroned, neither ironically nor seriously, as a Church Father. On the contrary, the 
manner in which he scrutinised ecclesiastical history bespeaks the most possible detachment.  
Conclusion: religion as a side effect 
To sum up, Agamben recognizes the impact that theology exerted over political theory and 
jurisprudence, but he balances it using the opposite perspective with the help of which one 
can ask about the political provenance of theological concepts. Following Girard’s 
intransigence on searching for the original20, Agamben treats theology as merely a reflexive, 
theoretical and late expression of what had been practised by  older institutions, even if 
without justification comparable in density to that elaborated by Christian theologians. In The 
Sacrament of Language: An Archaeology of the Oath (Agamben 2011b) those older institutions were 
at the centre of the author’s analysis: it turned out that religion, next to politics and law, had 
pullulated from the same, the oldest human institution, the oath. Oath illuminates the origin 
of language21, in turn marking a caesura when aliveness was alienated and abandoned by        
a creature who had begun to speak on its  behalf. Life found itself under the stress of 
justification22. Reading Il sacramento del linguaggio (2008) through the lenses of Il linguaggio e la 
morte (1982), one may risk the hypothesis that, in order to speak, this particular animal, just 
while becoming a human animal, sacrifices itself, disassociating from aliveness and creating 
the first homo sacer, which became the model for every following act of inclusive exclusion. 
Viewed from that perspective, religion and theology seem to be derivative, not foundational.  
Thus, Agamben deprived Schmittian political theology of its unjustified theological 
aura and the frightening seriousness that characterises “the ultimate”. He pointed to an even 
more serious phenomenon, turning back to “a time before the separation”23, meaning before 
politics and theology had diverged. This approach may compromise any more historically 
                                               
20  “A unique generative force exists that we can only qualify as religious in a sense deeper than the 
theological one” (Girard 1977, 24). 
21  Colby Dickinson even attempts to link the Agambenian quest for language with “the state of  original 
sin”, nonetheless he usually writes this term using quotation marks (Dickinson 2011a). 
22  For that reason, the ruling classes often turned to theology, which was believed to represent a neutral, 
external authority: “In the same way that sacrificial victims must in principle meet the approval of  the divinity 
before being offered as a sacrifice, the judicial system appeals to a theology as a guarantee of  justice. Even 
when this theology disappears, as has happened in our culture, the transcendental quality of  the system remains 
intact. Centuries can pass before men realize that there is no real difference between their principle of  justice 
and the concept of  revenge. Only the transcendental quality of  the system, acknowledged by all, can assure the 
prevention or cure of  violence” (Girard 1977, 23–24).  
23  “For this reason, it does not make sense to oppose secularism and the general will to theology and its 
providential paradigm; what is needed is, rather, an archaeological operation like the one that we have 
attempted here, one that, by moving upstream to a time before the separation that took place and that turned 
the two poles into rival but inseparable brothers, undoes the entire economic-theological apparatus and renders 
it inoperative” (Agamben 2011a, 285). 
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oriented philosophical projects, like those conducted by Blumenberg and Foucault, 
nevertheless the Agambenian perspective also threatens  the conservative tendency of 
conducting ahistorical analyses, or at least it blocks conservative interpretations of his own 
oeuvre. What can perhaps be estimated as the most promising opening of Agamben’s  
“theological” writings is the chance given, once again, to  speculative thought and the courage 
of  posing truly ultimate questions about the human mode of being in the world.  
At the same time, it is not nostalgia for dialectical synthesis that reigns in 
Agambenian thought, but its reversal. Agamben works like a patient watchmaker who, 
however, does not intend to repair a broken mechanism. His main task is to make                 
a performance out of showing the interiors of this mechanism in  their last detail, exposing 
how this precious toy functions and towards which aims it is used. Agamben’s deconstruction 
of the Western tradition targets its most coherent and cumulative element, namely the 
transposition of Greek metaphysics into Christian, especially Catholic, theology. His recently 
published books seem to be the itemised commentaries to Römischer Katholizismus und politische 
Form (1923) written by Carl Schmitt, where he depicted the political genius of the Catholic 
Church built on the one sacrificial mechanism, namely complexio oppositorum. To put it in         
a framework alien to the Schmittian intention, but tethered to his conceptual language, this 
mechanism provided  fertile ground for encompassing and overcoming every contradiction, 
which must have been very useful not only for theology, but also for papal policy as its power 
expanded and caused the physical or symbolic elimination of the Church’s enemies, like 
Gnostic Christianity and other Gnostics, to only name a few24. 
Agamben disarmed this sacrificial mechanism, which was particularly active in 
Catholicism since this institution needed an ultimate justification both for theology (which 
resulted in the strive for theodicy) and for its “earthly” existence, to explain what would be 
the  secular role of the Church after the Second Coming of Christ did not happen. While 
Schmitt was inclinable to affirm the whole history of Christianity, Agamben impugns every 
touchy element of its tradition, above all its political influence: from the titles attributed to 
Christ as the highest priest and, in consequence, the monopolization of spiritual power by the 
clergy, through the impossibility of  canonical law on the basis of religion which abolished  
governance by law, to the controversial status of ecclesiastic property. There is no left here 
one stone upon another… An urgent question arises henceforth: how to put philosophy 
practised on  rubble to good use? 
                                               
24  What I can point to only marginally here is the fact that Agamben, despite his sympathy for heterodox 
and esoteric legacy – probably somehow inspired by Frances Yates who facilitated his stay at the Warburg 
Institute – remains mostly connected to Spinozian pantheism. That determines his misguided understanding of  
Gnosticism, which, in turn, affects his anthropology, miserably suspended in limbo between hope and 
hopelessness, between self-assertion and condemnation.  
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TYTUŁ: Dyskretna przekora Giorgia Agambena 
ABSTRAKT: Wielu krytyków zarzucało myśli Giorgia Agambena ahistoryczność. Ostatnio 
podobne oskarżenia wysunął Alberto Toscano, formułując je przez przywołanie krytyki 
Hansa Blumenberga względem tezy o sekularyzacji oraz jego teorii zmiany epokowej. Według 
Toscano, z powodu akceptacji dla Schmittiańskiego pojęcia sekularyzacji, bazującego na 
substancjalizmie historycznym, Agamben nie tylko sprzeniewierza się metodologii Michela 
Foucaulta – którą deklaratywnie przyjmuje – ale także ciąży ku uznaniu dominacji pojęć 
teologicznych jako źródła całej filozoficznej tradycji Zachodu oraz jego instytucji 
politycznych. Moim zamiarem jest pokazanie, że nawet poniekąd powierzchowne 
stwierdzenia Agambena na temat sekularyzacji są równoważone przez podjęty przez niego 
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podwójny wysiłek. Po pierwsze, chociaż przyznaje on znaczenie dziedzictwu teologicznemu, 
to jednocześnie odrzuca pierwszeństwo religii jako niezbędnego fundamentu etyki i polityki. 
Co więcej, jego skrupulatne i bardzo gęste studia nad teologią chrześcijańską sytuują go na 
pozycji najbardziej przenikliwego ze współczesnych krytyków kościoła katolickiego oraz 
jakichkolwiek teologiczno-politycznych hybryd ukonstytuowanych poprzez nadużycie 
władzy. 
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